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A Secure Infrastructure For System Console and Reset Access
Andras Horvath, Emanuele Leonardi, Markus Schulz
CERN IT/ADC, Geneva, Switzerland
During the last years large farms have been built using commodity hardware. This hardware lacks components
for remote and automated administration. Products that can be retrofitted to these systems are either costly
or inherently insecure. We present a system based on serial ports and simple machine controlled relays. We
report on experience gained by setting up a 50-machine test environment as well as current work in progress in
the area.
1. Area of operation
Our LHC Grid system consists of several thousand1
‘worker nodes’, namely Linux-based PCs, connected
via Ethernet network and used for large distributed
calculations. These nodes have different designated
administrators who reinstall them rather often accord-
ing to current user needs. It is mainly during installa-
tion or when system administrators experiment with
new kernel patches etc. that console access is most
important.
Moreover, these computers can not be considered
reliable and experience shows that sometimes PCs
tend to ‘hang’ without any reproducible reason. In
this case (or when, for example, the kernel encounters
an internal programming error) nodes may need to be
restarted by some hardware means, e.g. pushing their
reset button.
Up to now both these operations have been done ‘by
hand’, e.g. by having to go physically to our Computer
Center to connect a monitor/keyboard to the nodes in
question or to push their reset button. In addition to
being inconvenient and time-consuming, this practice
increases the possibility of a human mistake.
We have moved the machines’ console from the
VGA screen and keyboard to using a serial line. Serial
console systems are easy to implement, have been long
since supported by Linux as well as being a ‘tradition’
in the computer industry.
The drawback of having a serial console instead of
connecting a monitor to the node is that most BIOSes
are unable to operate on a serial line, therefore at least
the Linux boot loader has to start before the serial line
can be used as console.
On the other hand, a ‘normal’ PC console provides
an interface for human access only. But why is ma-
chine control important? For example, an automated
monitoring system could restart non-responding ma-
chines a number of times (within a given time pe-
riod) before raising an alarm, thus reducing the neces-
sary amount of human intervention in case of ‘sponta-
1Current estimates show that our farm will grow to about
6000 machines by 2007.
neous hangs’. An automated installation system could
watch over the console of the nodes being installed and
take appropriate action based on pattern-matching on
console messages.
Our system offers controlled remote access for ad-
ministrators to the consoles and reset buttons of the
nodes they are in charge of.
2. Implementation
2.1. Hardware architecture
We wanted the smallest amount of and possibly the
cheapest extra hardware to be added. In principle,
it would be possible to have two serial ports in each
computer and ‘daisy-chain’ them using null-modem
serial cables so that one of the ports is the node’s own
console and it acts as a console server to one other
node. Provided that the console server is accessible
via the network, console operations can be performed
on its client remotely.
Having as many console servers as worker nodes
is not generally a good idea though as, apart from
possible scaling problems, taking down e.g. ten daisy-
chained nodes would mean that only the first one’s
console remains accessible from the network (the con-
sole server of which is outside these ten nodes).
Therefore we utilised special 8-port PCI serial
boards2 and have successfully installed up to three of
them in the same PC, which means that 24 ports can
be served from a single console server. These provide
standard RS-232 DB9 serial lines similar to the ones
usually on PCs.
Reset button pressing is implemented using serial-
line-controlled programmable relay boxes. These have
eight relay ports each and can be cascaded into a chain
of eight boxes, allowing up to 64 potential clients con-
trolled via a single reset server serial port. The relays
are programmed to give a one-second impulse to the
reset connector on the machines’ mainboard.
2Currently: ExSys EX-41098 (http://www.exsys.ch)
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2.2. Software and user interface
Users connect to a single web/application server
using any HTTPS and X.509 capable browser. Au-
thentication is done via X.509 user certificates, issued
by CERN’s own CA, and authorisation information
is stored in the same database as other system data.
This interface is where reset requests are submitted
(e.g. ‘I want to reset this-and-that node for a given
reason’) as well as where serial console interconnec-
tion information is retrieved from the database. A
user can then connect to the console server respon-
sible for given node at the push of a button with a
Java-based SSH client offered on the web page or use
his/her own SSH program to do so.
On the console/reset servers themselves Linux file
access control and permissions are used to separate
privileges. For each serial port a local Linux user
is created under the same name (e.g. user ttyS5 for
/dev/ttyS5) and its password is set so that the only
way to log in is via key-authenticated SSH.These users
have their login shell set to a very minimalistic termi-
nal program and the permissions on the TTY devices
are set so as to make it accessible only to the corre-
sponding user.
RSA keys are used to let users in into the console
server as the given ‘tty-user’. The RSA public keys
are stored in the database and distributed to console
servers whenever authorisation data changes. This is
work in progress and we consider using two keys for
each user a weak solution (see Section 3 for the current
status).
The same web interface is used for administrative
tasks (adding new users, modifying authorisation in-
formation etc). A console client detection procedure
can also be run from here which helps maintaining a
consistent interconnection database3.
The system is scriptable through direct database
queries (and SSH in case of console access). We use
Oracle 8i as database backend.
2.3. Network security
Our network is far too large to be considered trusted
and, therefore, encrypted and authenticated commu-
nication is in use.
The web interface can be reached via HTTPS.Both
users and the server hold a certificate issued by the
CERN CA the validity of which is checked.
Console services (from user’s machine to console
server) and internal data communication between web
server and console servers use SSH (protocol version
2) with RSA authentication.
3Of course, reset button interconnections can not be auto-
matically detected.
Secure connections to the database server are imple-
mented using SSH tunnels (we tried to use the built-
in SSL capability of Oracle 8i on our Linux boxes but
failed). The server’s identity is ensured by checking
its host key.
2.4. Costs (as of March 2003)
Serial consoles:
8-port serial boards and cabling:
CHF32.25 / node = $23.54 / node
(compare: standard console MUX with SSH access:
$110-$300 / node)
Remote reset:
Hand-made cables, connectors, relay boxes:
CHF23.2 / node = $17 / node
3. Work in progress
The early deployment and test systems were con-
sidered a success as ‘proof-of-concept’ and we have
learned much from the first version. Now we have
started the general integration of the system into
CERN’s already working services.
We aim at the utilisation of a still-in-development
system which provides a generic solution, based on a
central information store, to the distribution (and up-
date) of configuration files to our nodes. Both inter-
connection data and user authorisation information
can be managed this way thus eliminating the need
for a separate database and a separate access control
method.
That is, we distribute SSH key files for console ac-
cess and small text-based configuration files (about
which host is on which TTY port, needed for logging).
The same distribution system will pass the results of
the automatic detection procedure, generated into a
file, back to the central information store.
Moreover, the system will not be as much ‘dis-
tributed’ as we first aimed at. Instead of using our PC
farm nodes themselves to act as console/reset servers
for each other, we dedicate machines for management
purposes, one for each of our ‘rack’ units (about 44
machines). This solution is more costly as it needs an
extra PC and special serial hardware4 but these man-
agement nodes will be used for purposes other than
being console servers as well.
We have also dropped the web based management
interface — Linux command line tools are going to be
more easily scriptable. All configuration etc. will be
4Digi Acceleport Xem, for example (http://www.digi.com)
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done through the generic data modification interface
to the central information store.
Our software was re-written in order to increase ef-
ficiency and simplify the code (removing database ac-
cess parts etc). Certain parts though, especially most
of the low-level serial port access and client detection
code were reused from the previous version.
Currently, major features include:
• Constant serial console logging (via syslog)
• Automatic console client detection (on request)
• Full integration into local environment, authen-
tication/authorisation systems
• High security — controlled access to consoles
and restarting
• Command line interface for enhanced scriptabil-
ity
In the near future, we plan to roll the system —
the above-mentioned second version — out on a larger
scale.
4. Contact information
Please feel free to direct any questions or comments
to Andras.Horvath@cern.ch.
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